
On Monday 16th November 2026, people who opened the websites of the BBC, CNN, Zoom, IKEA, HSBC and 173 other organisations were sent malicious code. It didn’t come from those companies’ own servers. It came through Optimizely, a US company whose tool large websites use to test changes to their pages, and it was built to steal cryptocurrency and card details and, on older iPhones, to break into the phone itself.
Optimizely confirmed the attack in a notice on its status page at 4:02am Kenyan time on Tuesday. It says an unauthorised party exploited a vulnerability in its Experimentation product to add malicious JavaScript to “some customer projects”, and that it has fixed the flaw and removed the code. The first altered script was spotted on the BBC’s site at 7:21am on Monday, so the code was live for roughly 17 hours before nearly all of it was cleaned up.
So if you read the BBC or joined a Zoom call on Monday, should you worry? Mostly not. Three situations are worth checking, and the one that needed no click at all is an iPhone that hasn’t been updated.
How one company’s script reached 178 websites
Optimizely Web is used for A/B testing. A site shows two versions of a page, say a green “Buy” button and a blue one, to different visitors and keeps whichever does better. To do that, every page loads a small file of code from Optimizely’s servers. That file has a field called Project JavaScript, where the site’s own team can write custom code that then runs on every page.
That’s the field the attacker wrote into. Your browser can’t tell that code apart from the site’s own, because it arrives from Optimizely’s usual address, with Optimizely’s security certificate, from a source the site has already told the browser to trust. That’s why nobody had to break into the BBC’s servers. Whoever could edit Optimizely’s copy decided what ran on the BBC’s pages.
Report URI, a British web security company founded by researcher Scott Helme, found and mapped the attack. On Monday evening it checked 1,611 Optimizely scripts and found the code in 188 of them, belonging to 178 organisations: 32 banks and finance companies including HSBC, tech firms such as Salesforce, GitLab and Bitly, shops such as ASOS, airlines including Air France-KLM, telecoms operators, the crypto wallet maker Ledger, and Optimizely’s own website. Report URI thinks the real number is higher, because it could only check the scripts it found in time.
Optimizely has said little more. It has said the flaw was in the account sign-up flow for Experimentation, and that it has ended active sessions, revoked tokens and notified affected customers. It hasn’t said how many customers were hit or when the attacker first got in.
What the code did to visitors
Every visitor got the same script. What it could do to you depended on what you did on the page.
If you copied a cryptocurrency wallet address while one of these sites was open in a tab, the script could swap it for one of the attacker’s. You’d paste, send, and the money would go to them. It worked on Bitcoin, Ethereum, TRON, Solana and other addresses, including ones copied elsewhere while that tab stayed open. By 10:25pm on Monday, the attacker’s wallets had received about USD 7,040, or about KES 915,000 at KES 129.98 to the dollar on 17th November 2026.
From 4:43pm, the script also read card numbers, expiry dates and CVVs typed into a site’s own payment form and sent them to the attacker. Card boxes run by payment companies such as Stripe and Adyen, which load as a separate window inside the page, were out of its reach. Report URI says it can’t see how many cards were taken.
On iPhones and iPads, the script read the iOS version and, on older ones, loaded Coruna or DarkSword in a hidden frame. These are exploit kits: bundles of attacks on iOS security flaws that let an attacker take over a phone from a web page, with nothing for you to tap. Google’s threat researchers documented Coruna in March, and the version Google found was built to steal from about 19 crypto wallet apps. One group used DarkSword to copy messages, photos, saved passwords and crypto wallets off phones. Nobody has said how many phones, if any, were broken into on Monday.
What to check
Start with your phone. Open Settings, then General, then About, and look at the iOS version. The kit’s own notes say iOS 18.7.3 and later, and iOS 26.3 and later, are patched, and iOS 27 came after both. Older iPhones got their own fixes: Apple’s notes for iOS 16.7.15 and iOS 15.8.7, both from 11th March 2026, list the Coruna fixes for the iPhone 8, iPhone X, iPhone 7 and iPhone 6s. These are the newest versions for each group, from Apple’s security updates page:
| Your iPhone | Newest version | Released |
|---|---|---|
| iPhone 11 and later | iOS 27.2.1, or iOS 26.7.3 if you stayed on iOS 26 | 9th November 2026 |
| iPhone XS, XS Max and XR | iOS 18.7.12 | 9th November 2026 |
| iPhone 8, 8 Plus and X | iOS 16.7.16 | 11th May 2026 |
| iPhone 6s, 7 and SE (1st generation) | iOS 15.8.8 | 11th May 2026 |
So if your iPhone is on one of those versions, the kits used here don’t work on it. If it can’t update, Google’s advice is to turn on Lockdown Mode under Privacy & Security, and Coruna is written to back off when it finds that setting on. One visible sign of an attempt on Monday: on iOS 18.6 or older, affected pages reloaded themselves every 60 seconds.
The other two checks are quicker. If you sent crypto on Monday, compare the address in the transaction with the one you meant to pay. If you typed card details into one of these sites on Monday, watch your statements and call your bank about anything you don’t recognise.
Why every outside script is a risk
No Kenyan website appears on Report URI’s list; the nearest is HSBC’s site in Egypt. But the BBC, CNN and Zoom are global sites, and Kenyans who opened them on Monday got the same script as everyone else. Last month we wrote that cyberattacks in Africa grew fivefold in ten years, about as fast as the online services they target.
The 178 organisations trusted a supplier, and the supplier was breached. A Content Security Policy, a list a site gives the browser of the only places code may load from and data may be sent to, can stop this kind of attack. Of the affected organisations Report URI checked, 68 had no such policy and only 24 blocked the attack. HSBC’s policy stopped the main script, but a backup copy still ran because the policy allowed a setting called “unsafe-eval”, which Optimizely’s own documentation says some of its features need.
We think that’s the lesson for any business with a website, from a bank to an online shop: every script it loads from another company runs with the same power as its own code, and is only as safe as that company. For readers, checking your iPhone’s version takes a minute and covers the part of this attack that needed no click.





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